Manaf Sababi

Status Quo An Unfavorable Position for both republics

of Azerbaijan and Armenian

Abstract

In this paper, after a brief historical review of crucial events creating the present situation, a hypothesis based on absence of hostilities in Transcaucasian republics will be analyzed. The main object of this paper is to indicate that the conflict over Nagorno Karbakh has not been, and will not be, for the benefit of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Neither in long term, nor in short term.

Since Transcaucasian republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia gained their independence in 1991, both countries have been involved in a regular, but undeclared, war over the disputed area of Nagorno Karabakh. The result of the conflict has been a huge refugee crisis in Azerbaijan mainly from occupied territory (20% of the republic), and a devastating economic condition in the Armenia. Despite disclosed ethnic cleansing and violations of international law and human rights by Armenian forces, the efforts by international communities to bring an end to the violations are hardly worth to mention. Nevertheless, post-conflict support by world communities to handle the refugee crisis in Azerbaijan increased slowly to decline in the end of the last decade.

Unfortunately, the terrible armed conflict in Nagorno Karabakh got the minimum attentions and thereby interference by the world communities, and consequently the Azerbaijani and Armenians with their alliance were left alone to solve such a complicated problem. In this paper, I will concentrate on the history of events in an impartial manner and then try to bring focus on speculation on relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia in a situation without conflict.
Historical Background

Following independence years after WW1, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia were incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1920-21. Despite an intensive political struggle over territorial claims by Armenian and Azerbaijanis, the status of the regions of Nagorno-Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan was defined and settled in 1923. Zangezur was left within Armenia; Nakhichevan obtained the status of an autonomous republic whereas Nagorno-Karabakh was granted the status of an Autonomous Oblast. Consequently the territorial arrangements ordered by Stalin, without taking consideration for the public opinion, left the populations in both sides to feel hurt.

In Yerevan eyes, Bolsheviks was favouring Soviet Azerbaijan partly because of Kemal Atatürk (in newly founded republic of Turkey), whom they saw as a potential ally at the time and partly because of Narimanov’s stubborn protest. In the eyes of Stalin, Azerbaijanis under Narimanov’s leadership seemed to be more oriented towards socialist ideas than Armenians, who had been loyal supporters of the Tsar.

On the other hand, Azerbaijanis argued that Nagorno Karabakh had always been a part of Azerbaijani Khanate system and the majority of Armenian population had been settled in Nagorno Karabakh after Turkmanchay Peace Treaty between the Russian Empire and Iranian Shah in 1828. An important historical document which provides detailed information about the number and ethnic composition of the Karabakh population, is the taxation register of the Karabakh province, prepared by the Russian officials Yermolov and Mogilevsky, soon after the elimination of the Karabakh khanate in 1823. The register provides the number of population village-by-village and family-by-family and also informs about their ethnic belonging.

Resettlement of 18 thousand Armenian families in Karabakh occurred during the second Russo-Iranian war in 1825-1826. However, the massive resettlement process gained additional momentum after Turkmanchay Peace Treaty. According to the Article 15 of the Turkmanchay treaty, the Armenian population of Iran had been given a right to freely resettle to the regions of the Caucasus during a period of one year.

What ever the historical truth might be, since 1923, Armenian forces have constantly attempted to reverse the territorial arrangements between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In the late 1980s, with the Glasnost policy of Mikhail Gorbachev, a petition was prepared by the Armenian academy of sciences asking to transfer Nagorno Karabakh and Nakhichevan to the Soviet republic of Armenian. Later, supported by a huge demonstrations in Yerevan the authorities in Khan-Kendy requested Moscow for reunification with Armenia. Simultaneously, the Azerbaijanis in Armenia faced increasing harassment by Armenians.

Following refugee waves from Armenia to Baku, and relocation in Sumgait, with a large Armenian minority, the ground was prepared for conflict. On 27 February 1988, the collision between the two communities was a fact and then the ethnic conflict was followed by its own logic. According to Igor Nolyain, Soviet forces deliberately wanted to bring forth a conflict. However, the Soviet official stated 32 dead (26 Armenians and 6 Azerbaijanis) as a result of three days unrest in Sumgait, meanwhile Armenian sources estimated the figure over 100 dead.

In other words, the gun was fired and the conflict escalated in December of 1989 when Republic of Armenia passed a resolution incorporating Nagorno Karabakh into the Republic of Armenia. There were huge refugee flows between the two republics; large numbers of Armenians were forced to leave Baku either to Moscow or Yerevan whereas Azerbaijanis in Armenia were forced to leave Armenia. In January 1990, the collision between Armenians and Azerbaijanis was moved to Baku and consequently the tragedy of black 20-January was a fact. Intervention by Soviet army resulted to hundreds of Azerbaijanis’ dead.

In a chaotic condition in Moscow, paramilitary formations in both republics, but in particular in Armenian side, were growing in number and strength. There are evidence showing that planes loaded with military equipment (from Beirut) landed in Yerevan and then the materiel was transported to Karabakh. However, sporadic clashes became more frequent, and by June 1991, an undeclared regular war was taking place. Supported by regular armed forces of the Republic of Armenia, Armenian militants took control of Nagorno Karabakh more and more. Ironically, Armenia still denies officially its involvement in the war, in spite of evidence of the contrary.

As, the chaotic situation in Moscow was stabilized in its own way; the Russian political and military adviser saw the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict as part of a great game in their long-time policy. Armenia was not only backed by Russian arms (beside $1 billion in arms shipments, Russian soldiers also actively participated in offensives), but also by Armenian volunteers from Lebanon with long experience in war and by financial support from Diaspora mainly in USA and France. In contrast, retired Turkish military adviser supported Azerbaijanis, occasional and sporadic volunteers from Iran (and few other well-disposed persons). Also, Azerbaijan was backed by financial support (400,000 $) from Turkey, in one occasion.

In the beginning of 1992, a series of Armenian offensives resulted in the Armenian occupation of almost 20% of Azerbaijani territory and app. 1 million refugees. In addition to the near 300,000 refugees during the first wave from Armenia, about 700.000 persons were displaced internally leaving their homes in Nagorno Karabakh and its surrounding areas. A cease-fire was negotiated in May 1994, but all attempts including recurrent new planes by the organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to negotiate a settlement have failed.

The violations of International Law by the Republic Armenia have been criticized in UN (822, 854 under 1993) and in one international forum (The Charter of Paris 1990) recognizing that Armenia violates the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

The powerful Armenian lobby in the congress has heavily influenced the policy of United States towards the conflict. In October 1992, the Freedom Supports Act 907 was passed by the United States congress, denying all forms of governmental U.S. aid to Azerbaijan, unless it ceases use of force (?) against Armenia. After 11 September, this act was temporary suspended by Bush administration allowing U.S. military forces to use territory of Azerbaijan to convey war in Afghanistan and other forthcoming-armed conflict in the region.

Lost Opportunities

From a logical point of view, we are forced to go back in history at least 100 years to make a sense of the reasons behind the non-constructive development of relationships in Transcaucasian republics (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia). Whatever explains the correct nature of the conflicts in the region, peoples in these republics suffer hardly from a shortcoming evaluation of outcome from the conflicts. In consequence, they are ruled by conclusions drawn emotionally and blocked for any compromise.

From a speculative point of view, imagination in the events during the last two decades that could happen, but did not, might shed light on the opportunities missed by Caucasian citizens. Also, presentation of alternative progressive course instead of the conflict may, indeed, serve as guidance for the future attitude.

For instance, a meeting between Azerbaijani Popular Front and Armenian National Movement was arranged in Riga, 1990, to discuss the conflict. Although neither of the parties was in power, they enjoyed a great vogue in the domestic politic. Unfortunately, the leaders were fasten in their positions and accordingly missed a rare chance to create a solid dialogue for peaceful solution of already aggregated hostilities. That meeting was neither the first nor the last attempt, but perhaps the most crucial moment to steer for a change of attitude.

Hypothetically, let us turn the time back 15 years, and assume that Azerbaijanis and Armenians were reasonable and thereby restrained the course of development in Nagorno Karabakh. Although a succession of events that might have had influences on course of the conflicts, yet the basic attitude between Azerbaijanis and Armenians would be on friendly terms, in any case. Then, several options would be left to people/politicians to choose in order to improve gradually the relationship between two republics. Despite obvious disparity in religion and language, a long lasting symbiotic coexistence between Azerbaijanis and Armenians is not a secret fabrication. Armenian and Azerbaijanis have hade great impacts on each other’s lives than any other ethnic group in the region. So, it is not exaggerated to postulate that the failure of these two peoples to live in comfort and become independent societies is a result of direct hostilities towards each other’s.

Considering all factors bringing happiness and prosperity for mankind, some obvious basic needs build the foundation stone of a comfort existence. Peaceful life, basic economic support and condition for aspiration after an ordinary day full with spiritual and intellectual element are the main factors making life valuable. Making these points as Azerbaijanis and Armenians initial position we will look back (from 1985 to present) in retrospect to evaluate the lost opportunities.

In General, international economic cooperation and especially cooperation between neighboring states lay the foundations of a progressive economic growth in a country. Not only Azerbaijan and Armenia are economically paralyzed due to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, but also Turkey, Georgia and even Iran have been suffering hardly. In similarity to Bulgaria and Romanian, both republics (AZE and ARM) could derive advantage from regional cooperation and also indirectly back up each other’s to attract foreign investor. As a basic rule of free market policy, demand for a product controls the production. So, considering the size of populations in Transcaucasians, free access to the regional market is a decisive of Caucasian companies’ fate and bait for foreign investor. In addition, the domestic market (in this case regional market) increases the ability of internal production companies to compete with globalize trading. The role of oil and Diaspora (both Azerbaijani and Armenian) to strengthen the regional economy should not be neglected. Instead of confrontation policy, a co-operation among both Diaspora would doubtless bear enormous fruit for both folks.

Thus, it is obvious that Transcaucasian economy would develop in a positive way in absence of the conflict and thereby a better economic condition would establish for ordinary Azerbaijanis and Armenians. Today, the majority of Armenia and Azerbaijani inhabitant live under subsistence level. Unfortunately, this would be the case even the redistribution policy of country’s resources was different.

In contrast to previous conflicts between Azerbaijanis and Armenians, due to the advanced mass media, the degree of intensity on hatred is different. Since a decade ago majority of both Azerbaijanis and Armenians carry a feeling full of hatred and sorrow. The inward peace is constantly influenced by frightful reality. While the nationalistic fanatics use hatred for heating the conflict, the politicians make use of the conflict as a mean for their own ambition and to justify the slow process of democratization in both countries. Political persecutions and terrors belong to everyday life using the conflict as a pretext. A comparison between republic of former Soviet unions in Europe and Transcacasian republics indicate clearly those citizens in the later republics lives under severe political and economic stress. The fact is that stress is a natural part of an unsolved conflict.

It is truth that Armenia won the latest battlefield. Even if we assume that they will win future battleground too, which is not guaranteed judging from the history, an unjustified peace agreement still won’t bring a peaceful life and normal diplomatic relations in Caucasian. Perhaps, some naive nationalistic fanatics in both sides believe that people will leave the conflict behind as soon a peace treaty is settled. But, the existing conflict is per se indicating the opposite theory, when politicians force an unjust peace. Mutual understanding is the only way for a normal relationship without reservation between Caucasian peoples.

The third element, which Azerbaijanis and Armenians are missing since 1985, originates from the spiritual and intellectual life. Armenians success and Azerbaijanis defeat in the latest battlefield have forced majority of populations including elite class to focus all spiritual and intellectual activities on final outcome of the war. Any divergence from this line can easily be classed as treachery. As Armenian poets, filmmakers, artists, religious leaders and politicians propagate warmongering and hatred, Azerbaijanis also respond with the same method. Practically, the spiritual and intellectual life in Baku and Yerevan is dedicated for destructive way of thinking instead of humanistic education and exposing the positive advantages from being on neighbourly terms.

Paradoxically, as two-sided coin, Azerbaijani and Armenian cultures are in a state of dependence demanding mutual input to keep own distinctive character. Meanwhile input from Armenian lifestyle was breaking factor for Azerbaijanis to assimilate entirely either in Persian or Turkish culture, vice verse was truth for Armenians. Naturally, this kind of statement is controversial and could be regard as provocative. However, a look at Armenians culture living in the Middle East is manifesting the postulation in somehow.

Future Perspective

As far as Armenia and Azerbaijan ignores all efforts of peaceful fair resolution, stability and rebuilding process in both republics will be delayed. In addition, without a fair peace, stability will never be firmly established in Transcaucasian. Of course, fair peace is a relative conception for different people, but at the end an unbiased outsider can easily define it.

Long-term goals:

-Armenia hopes that in line with international principle of peoples’ self-determination Nagorno Karabakh will be accepted by international community as a territory apart from Azerbaijan. Also, Armenia hopes that Azerbaijanis will give up the territorial integrity in exchange for occupied land around Nagorno Karabakh. To achieve these two quite different aims Armenians rely on Russia and United States will exercise pressure on Azerbaijan, while providing comprehensive support to Armenia. But, the world picture is not so simple as one would like. Armenia’s former president Ter- Petrosian pointed out clearly the complexity of Armenians dependency on foreign powers in his famous farewell speech. Yet, his argument is valid.

The Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict illustrates a complex picture of world order regarding two important principles of international law, namely self-determination and territorial integrity. Armed conflicts in Kashmir, Kosovo, Chechen, Kurdistan, Middle East, North Ireland, Basque Ian in Spain, and separatist movements in China, Morocco and Taiwan, are some of those conflicts around the world to mention that argue the legitimacy of the international law. However, considering this reality in the world, it is far-fetched to believe that international community will treat the Nagorno Karabakh differently and discriminate in favour of Armenia. This particular conflict is also further complicated by the fact that 35% of population in Nagorno Karabakh prior to war were Azerbaijanis.

On the other hand, acceptance of Nagorno Karabakh as an independent country by international community does not mean that Azerbaijanis will automatically improve its relation unreserved to neighbour people. Any agreement forced by outsiders will make people (in both sides) carry a feeling full of sorrow and frustration.

- Azerbaijan hopes to liberate its occupied land either by peaceful resolution backed by international community or by building a strong army. Azerbaijanis believe that the economy of Armenia is much more vulnerable due to the conflict than Azerbaijani. Furthermore, Azerbaijanis believe that Iran’s attitude towards republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia will be more balanced as Azerbaijani national movement in Iran is intensifying. Also, awareness about ethnic band among Turkic republics such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan with Azerbaijan will increase by time and that will make republic of Armenia further isolated. Therefore, Armenia will lose more on a long drawn-out conflict and consequently will reconsider their occupations policy.

Also, Some Azerbaijanis believe that judging from the past a turning point will appear in the battlefield, sooner or later. So, the prevailing cease-fire must be used to build a strong army. It is unlikely that as far as president Heydar Aliyev is in the power, the war preparation will gain a hearing. However, the president is 80 years old now and has been treated for cardiac and prostate diseases. In relation to his health, the present circumstances can be changed over one night.

To move on a peaceful settlement of the conflict, there are several solutions deserving serious attention by both Azerbaijanis and Armenians. Meanwhile the Aland-modell is the most realistic option in this case, other options such as Land exchange should not be ruled out.

-ALAND option: A modified version of ALAND (Åland or Aoland) system may serve as a model for Nagorno Karabakh. Therefore, a short view on the ALAND could help us to clarify some controversial issues.

-The Aland Islands form an autonomous, demilitarized and anilingual Swedish province (unlike Nagorno Karabakh prior to the conflict) of Finland. They consist of more than 6.500 islands with a population around 40.000. The Alanders have been Swedish-speaking and the Islands belonged to the Kingdom of Sweden up to the 1808-1809 war, when Sweden was forced to relinquish Finland and Aland to Russia. When the Russian Empire started disintegrating, Finland proclaimed itself an independent republic in December 1917. At that time the Alanders in support of reunion with Sweden invoked same principle of national self-determination. However, the Finns were not prepared to comply with the Alanders’ demand for reunion with Sweden. The Parliament of Finland passed an autonomy act in favour of Alanders in 1920, but the Alanders were unwilling to accept it. In June 1921 the Council of the League of Nations (that time’s UN) decided that Finland should receive sovereignty over the Aland Islands. Finland, on his part, guaranteed the inhabitants of the Aland Islands their Swedish language, culture and customs. A treaty between Finland and Sweden on how the guarantees were to be effected supplemented the decision. Also, it was decided that Aland should be a neutral and demilitarized Autonomy. In 1922 the first election to the Aland Parliament (The Landsting) was held. Since then the Autonomy Act has been completely revised twice, in 1951 and 1993.

-Alands Legislative Assembly in 79 sections giving the Alanders to possess the right to pass laws themselves concerning their own internal matters and to exercise budgetary powers has approved act on the autonomy of Aland. The Act on the Autonomy can only be changed by the Parliament of Finland in constitutional order and with the consent of the Aland parliament. The Autonomy Act specifies the spheres in which the Aland parliament has the right to pass laws. The most important sectors are education, culture and preservation of ancient monuments, health and medical services, promotion of industry, internal communications, municipal administration, the police service, the postal service, radio and television. In other sectors like administration of foreign affairs, most aspects of civil and penal law, courts of justice, customs and monetary services, the laws of Finland are applied just like in the rest of the country. In addition, Aland has its own representative in the Parliament of Finland, who is elected in the same way as other Members of Parliament in Finland.

 The parliament of Aland consists of 30 members, elected every four years, appoints the Alands "government"(Landskapstyrelsen). The Landskapstyrelse group consists of 6 members from different political parties. Landsrad acts as chairman of the steering group.

-Land exchange option: An intensive political followed by armed struggle over Nagorno Karabakh and Zangezur has never been considered closed by populations of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijanis have always considered Zangezur as a physical hindrance between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, while the enclave Nagorno Karabakh part of Armenia by Armenians.

For Armenian this option is unacceptable. Partly Armenia will lose the border with Iran and partly resettlement of Zangezur residence will be emotionally impossible, international communities might secure even the economic matter. Emotionally impossible because, the republic of Armenia has already grip on both provinces. However, these two main obstructions have to be solved smoothly by Armenian politicians to be able to bring the negotiation to a successful close. For Azerbaijanis this option is also unacceptable. Nagorno Karabakh is a part of Azerbaijani soul and it is emotionally impossible to Azerbaijanis to think of the republic of Azerbaijan without Nagorno Karabakh. As they say "defeating in the latest battlefield does not mean the end of the war".